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Through his transactional operationalization, Williamson states that each generic form needs 
to be supported by a different contract law. More precisely, the arbitration between the three 
generic forms (i.e. hierarchy, market and hybrid) is based on a transaction costs minimization 
quest, where each generic form is a syndrome of transaction attributes. The analysis of Hybrid 
forms have been added subsequently and they  are therefore understood as organizational 
forms that are based on a neo-classical contract, including, longer-term arrangements that do 
not cover all contingencies, but include additional governance structures.  
 
Consequently, while the first thoughts of the transactional approach (Williamson 1975) were 
for a long run reduced to the arbitration between markets and hierarchies, hybrid analysis 
started constituting another important stream of TCA research. As pointed out by Coase 
(1988),  the problem today is no longer to identify the properties of the market and the 
hierarchy, but to define and analyze the differences among the multiple types of actual 
coordination modes, which are most often “hybrid”. And, it is precisely these definitions and 
this analysis that remains ambiguous in many ways. As underlined by Arrow (1985), it is 
difficult to match theory and empirical analysis because most real contracts do not resemble 
those described by theories. In fact, contractual typology is much more complicated. As 
would be expected, in the growing body of empirical studies, empirical operationalizations 
come in a variety of forms and transactional tests are based on a variety of dimensions. As a 
consequence, there still is no common framework based on the same criterion to classify these 
hybrid forms.  
 
During the last few years, the nature of buyer-supplier relationships has been u ndergoing 
some dramatic change and the poultry industry is a perfect illustration of these changes. In 
fact, contractual agreements hold an increasing important role since industrialization (Ménard   2 
1996). Several attempts have proposed a classification of the variety of inter firm  vertical 
arrangements in the agricultural sector that is based on a dominance of one party over the 
other (Mighell and Jones 1963, Mazé 2000, Rousset 2005), but this classification leaves aside 
other important contractual dimensions highlighted by authors such as Blanchot and 
Brousseau.  
 
We will start this analysis by  studying hybrid forms within the conversation of the 
Transaction Costs A pproach  (henceforth TCA), showing that many difficulties limit the 
creation of a clear classification of these forms. These difficulties are partly related to the 
variety of definitions of Hybrid forms. Moreover, the transactional framework also introduces 
further ambiguities in its conceptual treatment of Hybrids, as well as in its empirical studies. 
We will then present analyzes that offer a set of criteria for studying different contractual 
arrangements. These criteria could offer interesting bases for a clearer classification of hybrid 
form within TCA. These studies include scholars working on inter firm agreements, such as 
Blanchot (1997), as well as scholars working on contractual theories, such as Brousseau 
(1993). 
 
Finally, we will present a synthesis of qualitative interviews conducted from February to June 
2006 in the main French cooperatives and private companies. Unsurprisingly, the analysis of 
these interviews confirms the heterogeneity of governance typology from an activity to 
another and more precisely, the predominance of these “Strange forms”. We then used the 
criteria proposed by the earlier authors so as to think of a classification of the different 
governance modes established for each activity.  
 
1. “Strange forms” forms within the conversation of transactional costs approach: Many 
difficulties 
Transaction Costs Approach (henceforth TCA) shows many difficulties in the classification of 
these forms. These difficulties are partly related to the variety of definitions of Hybrid forms. 
Further ambiguities are also  introduced through the conceptual and empirical treatment of 
Hybrids. 
 
Difficulties relative to “Strange form”’s definition  
Hybrid form is by definition a composite of mixed origin. For organizational forms, it stands 
between markets and hierarchies and emerges to overcome the limits of these two polar   3 
forms. Effectively, they are a compromise between the benefits of centralized coordination 
and control and the incentive of decentralized decision making (Williamson 1991, Ménard 
2004).  
Qualified as “Strange” by Ménard
1  (1996), they include a  great diversity of agreements 
among legally autonomous entities doing business together, mutually adjusting, with little 
help from the price system, and sharing or exchanging technologies, capital, products, and 
forms represented, common characteristics do exist.  
 
A first condition for a form to be qualified “hybrid” relies on the autonomy of the partners as 
they must maintain distinct property rights. Ménard (2004) highlights three main regularities 
that exist within hybrids. First, hybrids include “pooling of resource” making the system 
selective rather than open, in which identity of partners do matter, it also leads to a need for 
cooperation and coordination through joint planning and information sharing. Second, hybrids 
“contract”, as they put in place more or less formal and complete contracts. And finally, as 
they remain independent with full capacity to make autonomous decision in last resort, 
hybrids “compete”.  
 
Hybrid forms have been progressively defined through time. In the early seventies, Blois 
(1972) referring to Penrose,  confirms the existence of a form called “ quasi vertical 
integration”. This form is described as a close relationship between suppliers and customers, 
in which the supplier is dependent for a significant proportion of its total business upon a 
particular customer.  
In a pioneer empirical study, Eccles (1981) showed how subcontracting coordinates through 
mechanisms distinct from markets and hierarchies. He analyzed relationships between general 
contractors and their subcontractors noticing that although contracts were short-term, related 
to specific projects, the contractual relationships were durable, with general contractors doing 
business with essentially the same partners over time. In almost all cases, they had been 
working together for over five years; in one case the relationship had been going on for 37 
years. He qualifies these types of relationships “quasi firms”. 
 
From  the mid eighties, conceptual studies highlighting these types of forms, increased 
dramatically. Bradach and Eccles (1989: 97) identify a form “ largely ignored by literature: 
                                                 
1 Ménard C., 1996, On clusters, Hybrids and Other Strange Forms: The Case of the French Poultry Industry, 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152, 154-183.   4 
“plural form”, Richardon (1972) evokes  “cooperative arrangements”, Macneil (1978) 
focuses on  “relational contracting”, Mariti and Smiley (1983) point out  “joint ventures”, 
Miles and Snow (1986) mentioned “Dynamic Networks”, and so on.  
 
As explained by Ménard (2004), many expressions are used to describe a quite similar 
concept. From networks, to clusters, to supply chain, including symbiotic arrangements or 
quasi integrated partners and so forth, when it comes to these intermediate forms, vocabulary 
itself is not settled yet (2004: 370) “Talking about a hybrid form means being confronted to a 
variety of typologies: franchising, cooperatives, partnerships, collective brand marks, 
alliance, networks […] the typology of hybrid forms is not well established yet”. 
In this article we will focus on hybrid forms among vertical relationships between buyers and 
sellers, putting aside horizontal relationships.  
 
These relationships include simple furniture arrangement, subcontracting, quasi integration, 
quasi vertical integration, oblique quasi integration, partnerships and so forth. 
 
Subcontracting or supplier arrangements are contracts for the sale of one firm’s output to 
another. Supplier arrangements can be characterized as contractual agreements to provide a 
particular type or line of goods and services within a specific time frame. These relationships 
can be even more integrated. In its less integrated form, it is a simple furniture arrangement 
that does not include close relationships. Tight subcontracting relationships are studied by 
Monteverde and Teece (1982) throughout the concept of quasi integration. They define quasi 
integration as including the ownership (or payment) by a downstream firm of the specialized 
tools that are used by the supplier in the fabrication of components. This definition may be 
distinguished from that outlined by Blois (1972) for whom quasi vertical integration dos not 
imply asset ownership. For Blois, quasi integration concerns every supplier-buyer relationship 
as long as it becomes a dependency relationship.  
 
Partnerships are also often used in economic literature. In fact, loosely defined, partnerships 
have a large definition, as it can include cooperation, alliances, joint ventures and so forth. In 
fact, actors undertaking a transaction are very often qualified as “partners”. Partnerships in 
vertical relationships are defined as purposive strategic relationships between independent 
firms who share compatible goals, strive for mutual benefits and acknowledge a high level of 
mutual interdependence (Spekman and Mohr 1994). Partnerships can be informal and can   5 
settle with time, resulting from the continuity of a relationship leading to a personal 
relationship. Blanchot (1994) distinguishes partnerships from traditional sub-contracting 
explaining that sub-contracting relationships, contrarily to partnership, introduce competition 
for obtaining lowest prices.  
 
Joint venture can also appear in vertical integration relationships. They include the creation of 
a new joint unit that is formally independent from the entity two parent companies. The two 
(or more) parties of the joint venture are often called partners.  However, joint ventures are 
different from partnerships as they include the creation of a new shared unit and a more 
complete contract.  
Franchise  can also appear in vertical relationships, more commonly in the distribution 
channel. It is an agreement between a parent organization “franchisor” and a local outlet “the 
franchisee” to sell a product or service using a brand name developed by the franchisor. The 
franchisor typically sells a right to use an intellectual property in return for a lump sum 
payment and an annual royalty fee based on sales for a period of time (Shane 1996). The 
franchisee usually accepts to adhere to the franchisor requirements for product mix, operating 
procedures and quality. In return, the f ranchisor typically agrees to provide managerial 
assistance, training, advertising assistance and so forth.  
 
The Cooperation concept is also recurrent. It is a relational mode that concerns entities during 
a limited period of time. It can occur for a specific project. It does not link entities that have 
the same vocation or the same identity. However, cooperation is a premise of hybrids, as if it 
lasts cooperation becomes a hybrid form. According to Blanchot, “ cooperation” includes 
partners that must have a common purpose. Contrarily, other authors such as Bucley and 
Casson (1988) or Anderson and Narus (1990) do not highlight on the importance of having a 
common purpose.   
 
This brief presentation of examples of hybrid forms shows the multitude of forms and the 
difficulty of having a clear definition of each form, definitions that can n ot be interchanged 
with another. Indeed, very often, the use of partnership, cooperation or quasi integration for 
example, is made regardless of their main characteristics. As commented by Oliver and Ebers 
(1998: 550) “The increase in the number of studies on inter organizational relations and 
networks has contributed to a rather messy situation marked by a cacophony of 
heterogeneous concepts, theories, and research results”. Moreover scholars such as Blanchot   6 
(1998), show that there is not even a unified definition of each type of hybrid form. He 
synthesizes twenty two definitions of inter firm agreements relying on works treating of inter 
firm relationships, and concludes that seventeen studies (77%) take into account temporal 
adhesion mode, while only twelve (54%) evoke the degree of cooperation between the firms, 
and only seven (32%) introduce the adjustment mode.      
 
Difficulties related to conceptual ambiguities of “Strange forms” in the transactional 
framework 
Williamson states that each generic form needs to be supported by a different contract law. 
His model is rooted in Macneil’s (1974, 1978) contract typology which advances three 
contractual classifications: classical (market form), neo-classical (hybrid form) and relational 
contracts (Bilateral or unified). The arbitration between the three generic forms is based on a 
transaction costs minimization quest where each generic form is a syndrome of transaction 
attributes.  
In fact,  Williamson (1973, 1975) as expressed by the title of his book “Markets and 
Hierarchies”, first focuses on market and hierarchy putting aside the continuum of forms 
between these two poles. However, he quite rapidly adds these forms as significant elements 
of his analysis  explaining how much these forms finally are not that strange (1985:83): 
“Whereas I was earlier of the view that transactions of the middle kind were very difficult to 
organize and hence were unstable, I am now persuaded that transactions in the middle range 
are much more common”.  
Therefore, h is 1991 article constitutes an extension of the initial model where he  includes 
these alternative forms, which he labelled “hybrids”. In the following table, Williamson’s 
framework is represented, including the multiple forms from market spot contract to vertical 
integration.  
Table 1: Williamson’s framework  
  Specificity 
Frequency 
Weak  Medium  High 
Occasional  Trilateral Governance  






Bilateral governance     Unified governance (firm)           
                                                     
                «Relational Contract  » 
Williamson (1979: 254)   7 
 
Williamson advances that Hybrids are arrangements that  are based on “neo classical 
contracts” (theses contracts being adequate to transactions occasional, mixed and highly 
specific). Neo-classical contracts rise in case of unanticipated disturbances for which 
adaptation is needed, as they provide a tolerance zone. They privileged arbitration rather than 
courts in resolving disputes and evaluating performance. This governance form is therefore 
called “trilateral governance”.  
 
This definition of hybrids is quite clear, and hybrid forms, following neo classical contracts, 
should appear in case of intermediate level of uncertainty and intermediate asset specificity 
(Williamson 1991:284). However, in his 1979 article, Williamson extends his analysis, adding 
“relational contracts” that are supposed to appear with transaction recurrence. Yet, as 
relationships between partners get more tightly integrated, these relational contracts take 
place, moving from trilateral mode of governance to bilateral mode of governance, in which 
the reference is no longer the initial agreement as for neo classical contract but the “ entire 
relation as it is developed  through  time. This may or may not include an “original 
agreement” and may or may not result in great deference being given it”. (Williamson 
1979:238).  
 
However further work on hybrids generally exits these “relational contracts” (in the sense of 
Macneil). As underlined by Josserand
2 (2001:60), relational contracts are no longer presented 
in Williamson 1991 article, and hybrids are from then, described as based on the unique neo 
classical contract. Still, among the great number of studies that place hybrids under the 
umbrella of neo classical forms, Brousseau and Codron
3 (1998) also assimilate “hybrid” to 
Macneil’s relational contract. They describe long term relationships between distributors and 
importers as based on relational contracts that should offer cooperation towards a better 
regularity in the distribution.  
 
To this first ambiguity concerning the contract reliance of hybrids (either neo classical or 
relational contract), Quélin
4 (2002) explains that the effect of frequency is ambiguous in the 
                                                 
2   Josserand E., Les logiques d’organisation : un point de passage obligatoire pour l’économie des coûts de  
transaction,  59-75,  (eds) La théorie  des coûts de transaction , 2001, Vuibert. 
3 Brousseau E., Codron J.M, 1998,  La complémentarité entre formes de gouvernance : le cas de 
l’approvisonnement des grandes surfaces en fruits de contre-saisons, Economie rurale, N°245-246, 1130-1148. 
4 Quélin B., Les frontières de la firme, Edition Economica 2002, 138 pages.   8 
transactional model. In fact, frequency of the transaction and disturbances should normally 
deteriorate hybrids efficiency, leading to a more unified form. That is, the more transaction 
occurs, the less hybrid forms should be present (Williamson 1991:283). However, Williamson 
(1985) and Ménard (2000: 249-250) add that, when specificity is high, occasional transactions 
can also require unified governance. This statement is contrary to the framework that shows 
that facing high level of specificity, occasional transactions only lead to hybrid forms.  
 
Difficulties related to the variety of  empirical  studies of “Strange forms” in the 
transactional framework  
As would be expected, in the growing body of empirical studies on inter-organizational 
relations and networks, empirical operationalizations come in a variety of forms, and, even 
though scholars readily accept that governance is a multidimensional phenomenon, there still 
is no consensus of the dimensions that characterize this phenomenon.  
 
As a matter of fact, the most common application of  TCA focuses on vertical integration 
decision, typically highlighting the manufacture’s decision to backward integrate into the 
supply of materials or components or forward integrate into distribution and sales. So, these 
applications, in their “positive” tradition
5, test TCA through studying the relationship between 
independent variables representing transaction attributes (i.e., specificity, uncertainty..) and 
dependent variables representing the generic form adopted (for a synthesis, Klein and 
Schelanski 1995, Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, Boerner and Macher 2002). Hence, measures 
of this dependant variable differ and earliest empirical studies such as Masten (1984), 
Meehan, Masten and Snyder (1989), Walker Weber (1984, 1987) focus more frequently on 
the binary “make or buy” decision. For instance, scholars measure if the component is 
procured through an outside supplier or if it is produced in-house. Other studies, such as 
Balakrishnan and Wernerfet (1986), Levy (1985), Maltz (1994, 1995) used a continuous 
measure of the “make or buy” decision, studying the “degree” of vertical integration, ranging 
from 0% to 100%. 
 
However, forms of inter firm relationship are operationalized in a variety of forms.  One of 
the pioneer studies of “hybrid” governance mechanisms remains Monteverde and Teece’s 
                                                 
5 This “positive” way of testing TCA, has been largely criticized by authors such as Walker and Poppo (1991) 
and Masten (1993). As a result, a new wave of empirical work tested Transaction Cost Theory in a “normative” 
way, highlighting, the imp lication of  using the insights of TCA on firm’s performance (Poppo and Zenger 1998, 
Walker and Poppo 1991..).   9 
1982 survey. Through this study, they examine “quasi vertical integration” in the U.S. 
automobile industry. They use a simple binary measure of quasi vertical integration setting to 
“one” each time that the tools and dies used to produce the component are owned by the 
assemblers and not by the supplier (and “zero” if the tools and dies are not owned and/or paid 
by the assembler). However, this survey is limited to a very narrow type of sub contracting 
that is very close to vertical integration, as the supplier finally only offers his labour force. It 
leaves aside considerations such as the nature of the relationship, the extent of cooperation 
and joint action, the mode of conflict resolution, the duration of contract and its formality and 
so forth.   
Heide and John (1990)  use TCA to examine how buyers and suppliers rely on close 
relationships as a means of safeguarding s pecific investment and adapting to uncertainty. 
They put in place three dimensions: joint action, continuity and verification of supplier. Joint 
action describes the extent to which the parties undertake activities jointly rather than 
unilaterally. Continuity describes the perception of the firm that both parties expect the 
relationship to continue into the future. The verification of the supplier describes the efforts 
undertaken to verify the capabilities of the supplier. However the hypothesis tested are more 
interested in measuring the effects of continuity expectation and increased verification efforts 
on joint action. It does not attempt to put in light the different typologies of governance 
resulting from the combination these three criteria. 
 
Palay (1984) offers a study that highlights the following five elements of governance that are  
methods of enforcement (e.g. existence of potential alternatives, realized mutuality of 
interest…), adaptations to changed circumstances (holding to original terms, flexibility), type 
of adjustments made (unilateral, negotiated), information stability (whether or not they 
exchange information for short term specific planning) and structural planning attempts 
(whether or not they exchange information for structural planning). Palay aggregates data 
relative to these five dimensions of governance structure creating three groups that are 
market, “mixed” and relational. However, no classification is offered inside the hybrid 
continuum.   
 
Consequently, even though “Hybrid” forms have been added to the transactional literature, 
and even though empirical studies do exist, their study remains deficient in some important 
ways. Indeed,  there is no  theoretical framework that explains the content of these 
relationships, and  the empirical  studies  applied to hybrid forms  do not really aim at   10 
classifying forms relatively to homogeneous dimensions.  According to  Ménard  (2004), 
Williamson’s  framework should be extended, so as to provide a  more  useful tool for 
integrating and ordering the different forms of hybrids. 
 
 
2. Seeking for a classification of these Strange forms: promising studies  
 
The research for a hybrid classification made us  go beyond the exclusive transactional 
literature, to add studies related to inter firm agreements literature and economics of contracts 
literature. Studies such as Blanchot and Brousseau’s articles, as well Macaulay’s insights 
concerning informal contracts, provide interesting insights in “re thinking” for a more 
complete framework.  
 
Blanchot (1998) highlights three main dimensions for determining a typology of the nature of 
inter firm agreements. These dimensions  are the degree of cooperation of partners, their 
adhesion’s temporal mode and their adjustment mode.  
The degree of cooperation can take three forms depending on the extent of joint action and of 
common tasks undertaken between the partners.                        
                                           
                                           Common tasks  
                                         Yes                      No 
         
                                 Yes 
 Joint action    
                                 No                
 
The weakest degree of cooperation is due to the inexistence of joint action (1)  while the 
highest degree of cooperation is relevant to situation in which common tasks are undertaken 
through joint action (2).  
However, as the degree of cooperation gives no information about the duration of the 
relationship and its recurrence, Blanchot highlights four main situations.  
                                                                    Renewal probability   
                                                                       Weak           Strong 
                                  Middle to  
                                  Long run   
         Duration                  
                                   Spot to          
                                Short run                  
 
  ( 2)       (3)    
   (1)   
  ( 3)       (4)    
   (1)     (2)   11 
Finally, Blanchot points out a dimension illustrating the way partners face contingencies. He 
highlights two main situations. First, decisions can be adjusted ex post, in that case, contracts 
are similar to Macneil’s “classical contract”, meaning that they are widely described and 
parties can refer to them for determining their behaviour. Second, decisions and problems can 
be managed through time, based on mutual adjustment, referring to what Brousseau defines as 
a “decentralized authority” or to Macneil’s “neo-classical” contract.  
 
Building on these three dimensions, Blanchot puts in place an ambitious framework that helps 
to classify different types of inter firm arrangements. We will highlight classifications of 
vertical production arrangements.  
He presents many forms, i.e. simple furniture arrangements, sub contracting (also called quasi 
integration or  quasi vertical integration) and oblique quasi integration.  Simple supplier 
furniture arrangements are therefore uniquely based on the ordering of product by the buyer. 
The supplier is the unique producer of the product, there is no joint action. In fact, the buyer 
does not participate to the conception neither to the production process; he simply orders the 
product that he buys once produced. Sub contracting relies on the ordering of a product by the 
buyer. But the buyer establishes a set of technical requirements. The supplier must respect 
these requirements. Joint action does exist as both parties participate in the production 
process. Relying on Baudry (1995), Blanchot explains that subcontracting is a  quasi 
integration that is often a short term agreement. And, he opposes it to Baudry’s “Oblique 
vertical integration” concept, that is  an evolution of simple subcontracting,  including 
collaboration between the buyer and its supplier. In fact, while subcontracting simply involves 
an order to a supplier that must accomplish the production following a precise set of technical 
requirements, oblique vertical integration includes a “participation” of the supplier in the 
production process.  
Table 2: Examples of Blanchot’s classification of most common hybrid forms 
  Arrangements characteristics’  
Type of  
Arrangement  
Degree of cooperation  Temporal  
Adhesion mode  
Adjustment 
mode    
…..  1  2  3  1  2  3  4  1  2 
Supplier arrangement  ?      ?        ?   
Quasi integration  /Sub 
contracting 
  ?    ?        ?   
Oblique quasi integration       ?          ?    ? 
Blanchot (1998:17)   12 
Even though this framework puts aside important dimensions such as the enforcement modes 
(credible commitments, supervision) as well as the formality of contracts, it constitutes an 
interesting attempt to classify inter firm relationships, presenting clear indicators of the nature 
of inter form arrangement.   
 
These missing dimensions are present in the contractual literature as well as in Macaulay’s 
preliminary study of non contractual inter firm relations. Brousseau (1995) presents an even 
more complete reading of contracts. In fact, he starts by explaining that hybrid forms continue 
to be under-used because of methodological reasons. Thus, most studies rely on the “market 
or hierarchy” binary choice. To overcome this lack, he offers a unified tool, a “morphologic 
grammar” so as to describe contracts throughout a combination of seven clauses (namely A, 
B, C, D, E, F and G). Contrarily to Blanchot, rather than to name these forms, he chooses to 
describe contracts by the collection of their features.  
 
Brousseau sets in place four main mechanisms for reading contracts. A first set of “technical 
governance” mechanisms includes the modes of coordination chosen by partners concerning 
strategic (clause A), organizational (clause B) and operational (clause C) decisions.  
 
Clause A describes the process that is set up to redefine the objective of the coalition (i.e. Its 
output and therefore the market on which it competes, and the way it competes). Clause B 
concerns the ability to  re-assign tasks among participants or to redefine the nature of the 
utility brought by each party without altering the goal of the contractual arrangement. More 
precisely, when  a contingency occurs, this clause defines the way  co-contractors can 
reorganize or not the production and exchange process. Finally, clause C concerns the power 
to modulate through time and space the modality of usage of the different assets involved in 
the  transaction  (i.e. d efining the intensity of use of the input, product delivery rhythm, 
schedules…).  These three coordination modes can be established ex ante throughout a 
complete contract, in that case it is “routine” based. Or, contracts can be left incomplete and 
adjustment is therefore undertaken through time and contingencies throughout an authority 
mechanism that can be centralized or decentralized.  
A second set of enforcement mechanisms is designed to describe the mechanisms used to 
avoid o pportunistic behaviour and to constrain agents to enforce their promises. The 
enforcement mode is described through  credible commitments (clause D) and  supervision 
mechanisms  (clause E). Credible commitments can be based on bilateral hostage (mutual   13 
reliance and both agree to modify specificity of the input), u nilateral hostage (one party 
deposits a hostage in the hand of the other) or no credible commitments at all. Supervision 
mechanisms can be undertaken through a self-enforcement mode, in that case each party 
exercises control over the other and the only recourse is to terminate the agreement. It can be 
based on an external non specialized supervisor (courts), a specialized supervisor that can be 
one of the co-contractors or by a third party that is specialized in contract supervising.  
 
A third set concerns the  remuneration and risk sharing mode (clause F). Four modes are 
distinguished. A first mode relies on a customized basis, in which each owner is remunerated 
at its marginal productivity. Second, remuneration can be based on a collective basis, meaning 
a fixed sharing in which the output is divided among contractors, defined by ex ante rules and 
not on contribution rules. Third, remuneration can be based on a flat rate in which one agent 
assumes losses and collects profits and remunerates the other’s assets ex ante. Finally, 
remuneration can depend on the intensity of use of the assets, or of the ex post evaluation of 
the efforts.  
The last set concerns contract duration (clause G). Contracts can occur once, they are then 
called “spot contracts”, they can concern a short term period or a long term period.   
Table 3: Brousseau’s grammar to describe bilateral contracts (1995: 418) 
Objective of the clause                         Possible clause alternatives                                    
A                                       1                                2                                     3                            
Strategic  coordination    Routine             Centralized authority    Decentralized authority           **                                                                                                                                                                                                    
B                                      1                                 2                                      3                                
Organizational coord       Routine             Centralized authority     Decentralized authority          ** 
C  
Operational  coord             1                              2                                        3                           
                                         Routine               Centralized authority    Decentralized  authority        **                               
D                                       1                                2                                         3                         
Credible commitm           No C.C                Unilateral  hostage        Bilateral hostage                   ** 
E                                       1                                2                                        3                           4 
Supervision              Self-enforcement       Non specialized              Contractor                  Specialized 
Mechanism                                                   supervisor                      supervisor                  supervisor 
F                                      1                                2                                        3                           4 
Remuneration              Marginal                    Fixed                                Flat                         Intensity 
System                         productivity              sharing                              rate                           of use 
G                                    1                                    2                                      3                                 ** 
Duration Contract       Spot contract                Short-term                    Long-term 
   14 
Throughout these seven c lauses, Brousseau offers a  rich method for reading contract 
typologies based on their essential features.  
This “contractual grammar” enables us to describe contract characteristics rather than to name 
them, avoiding the frequent misunderstanding caused by categorical denominations that are 
not always recognized by the whole research community. It also enables to take into account 
original contracts that do not belong to the standard and well-known categories. Brousseau 
presents examples of inter firm typologies (i.e. based hierarchy, market, joint ventures, 
cooperatives) based on the established features.  His work remains to us one of the most 
complete  insights for reading contract typologies.  However,  further digging must be 
undertaken to link these features to the transactional analysis. 
 
Jaspere and Ende (2006) offer another type of conceptualization of the organizational form 
that is exclusively based on the study of vertical integration. Even though this classification is 
not specialized for studying hybrid forms, it constitutes an interesting insight for further 
research.  
Their classification is determined as a configuration of four main dimensions. The first 
dimension  ownership represents the extent to which the buying firm owns the supplier 
(internalization, minority stake or purchasing through independent supplier), secondly, task 
integration measures the extent to which the firm performs the upstream task required to 
develop and produce the component. Thirdly, coordination integration refers to the extent of 
information exchange between the focal firm and the component supplier. Finally knowledge 
integration represents the extent that the firm possesses the knowledge that is required to 
develop and produce the component. 
 
At one extreme, the buying firm owns the component supplier, performs all upstream tasks 
internally, extensively  coordinates with the internal component supplier, and possesses 
detailed knowledge about the component. This organizational configuration of full integration 
(i.e. high values on each dimension) facilitates the alignment of the component with the firm's 
end product and allows the firm to appropriate  that i s created in the relationships. 
Furthermore, the firm possesses detailed upstream knowledge which allows it to perform all 
tasks and to further specialize in this component. In addition, this integrated approach reduces 
the risks of spillovers, because of the absence of involvement from external firms. Following 
the above discussion this configuration can be theorized to be the most appropriate for the 
organization of  components characterized by high interdependence, uncertainty,  asset   15 
specificity and strategic importance.  At the other extreme, the firm purchases the component 
from an independent supplier, performs no upstream tasks itself, does not coordinate with this 
external supplier, and possesses no knowledge about the component.  
 
Even though the development of detailed middle-range theories is beyond the scope of this 
paper, and that  consequently, it does not take into account dimensions such as contract 
duration, enforcement mechanisms, remuneration and so forth,  it  presents several 
configurations that lie between the two  extremes of full integration and arm's length 
relationships (e.g. joint venture) to  illustrate the wide range of configurations that can be 
conceptualized with our approach. And, above all, it offers an original attempt for the 
establishment of a contractual typology.  
 
Figure 2: Illustrative configurations of the dimensions of integration 
 
Jaspers and Ende (2006:825) 
 
 
3. Evidence from the French poultry industry 
 
Presentation of the French Poultry industry  
The French aviculture is leading the European production, and is second in world exports
6. It 
has developed quite late compared to United States’ (Ménard and Klein 2004). Indeed, it 
remained for a long time organized in a traditional way and the first symptoms of 
industrialization only appeared in 1950 (Diry 1985). Since then, the industrial operators 
usually called “integrators” started holding an increasing role in the sector.  
 
 
                                                 
6 For more details see Ménard (1996).    16 
The typical production chain is represented as follows: 
Hatching eggs are transformed into hatching baby chicks through a selection and incubation 
process, once the baby chicks produced; they are transported to growers (raising farmers). In 
parallel, a feed m ill mixing ratios for raising chicks is operated by the feed producers. 
Growers, then feed animals for a seven week period time (in average) for standard chicken 
and an eleven week period for certified chicken. Finally, chicken are slaughtered and 
processed (it can be frozen if it is a standard chicken) so as to be distributed (see figure 1).  







The French poultry sector is very concentrated and the number of operators is reduced to 25 
companies that provide the whole activity. French companies are mainly composed of private 
groups and agricultural cooperatives.  
These two types of companies do not organize themselves in the same way. Indeed, while 
private groups were at the beginning generally
7 slaughterers that decided (or not) to upward 
integrate, cooperatives started with the upward activities, dealing with the production chain 
more precisely with  the combination of “feeding and growing”  activities.  In most cases, 
private groups are directly in contact with the distribution channel (i.e. Carrefour, Géant, 
Monoprix...), which orders products with technical and sanitary requirements. Starting from 
that order, these private groups whether organize their own production chain (if they are 
integrated), or, organize these activities through spot market, or contracting with  farmers, 
incubators, and feed producers, or they also often contract with a single entity, generally a 
cooperative which already masters the entire production chain. However, variants do exist, 
and while slaughterers can be more or less integrated, cooperatives can also integrate the 
slaughtering activity being therefore directly in contact with the distribution channel.  
 
                                                 
7 One exception exists as the private group “Arrivé”, started as a feeder, and extended progressively its activities, 







Processors Distributors  17 
A cooperative is a combination of producers (breeders) that are members of the cooperative
8. 
In fact, to become a member, farmers must pay an “entry ticket” transforming the member in 
a sort of “stockholder” of the cooperative that can therefore be described as a “multi 
ownership” structure. Cooperatives never own breeding building, they define technical 
requirements to their members through a document the “cahier des charges” (it sets a list of 
technical and sanitary requirements), provide them technical support, collect and select the 
products, and take care of the packaging of their members. The cooperative holds property 
rights on the brand name and is responsible for controlling quality, and, the respect by all 
parties of the requirements  contractually agreed upon. It is in charge of marketing the 
products and of contract negotiations with retailers. Consequently, members will not negotiate 
buying and selling prices individually, as the cooperative will be the single negotiator. In fact, 
the cooperative can be understood as an “organizing force” that harmonizes the efforts of its 
members towards  a common purpose. Once created, cooperatives decide (or not) to 




The purpose of this study was to highlight the way these poultry companies such as LDC, 
DOUX, UNICOPA, COOPAGRI and so forth, organize the production chain of standard 
chicken relying either on the spot market, on contractual agreements or on vertical integration. 
In fact, we were interested in classifying the modes of governance following the transactional 
cost approach.  
Data was developed from a series of interviews held between February and June 2006 with 
French groups. These interviews were all conducted with either upstream directors, or general 
directors, depending on the size of the group and of its internal organization. However, there 
are two companies (a cooperative and a private group) for which we interviewed respectively 
two and three informants. In total, we conducted interviews with thirteen individuals from ten 
poultry companies, collecting information concerning the four main activities of the 
production chain. Meetings lasted between one and two hours in average. They were all 
recorded, retranscribed and analyzed. The interviews were structured, presenting questions 
that were essentially related to the way companies organize the four main activities of the 
production chain. Groups were first asked if activities were undertaken in-house, through the 
                                                 
8 For more details see Ménard (1998).  
9 In the french poultry industry most cooperatives have integrated the slaughtering activity. “Le Gouessant” for 
example  integrated slaughtering building but  rapidly sold it back because they could not manage the new 
activity in which they were not specialized.    18 
contracts  or  spot markets. Then, each time that these activities relied on contractual 
agreements, we asked additional questions based on the insights presented earlier. We also 
added questions concerning the “formality” of the contractual agreements, referring to 
Macaulay’s study (1963), as we noticed that the poultry industry is very often concerned with 





Unsurprisingly, the analysis of these interviews showed heterogeneity of governance modes 
from an activity to another. In fact, the classification of activities undertaken in-house or on 
the “spot market” was easy, whereas a classification was tougher for contractual agreements.  
In the following table (see Annex 1 and 2), we present a synthesis of the three modes of 
governance chosen by private groups and by cooperatives for each activity. We ranked from 0 
to 5 the number of groups that had chosen the indicated mode of governance. Most of the 
activities used a mixed governance mode, integrating a part (represented in percentage) of the 
activity and contracting the remaining part (in one case, they also relied on the spot market). 
Table 4: General presentation of the governance mode chosen 
Private 
Groups 
Market Spot  Contractual agreements  In-House 



































I                    0  1  1  2  1  0  1  2  1 
AF                    0  2  1  2  1  1  1  1  2 
RF  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  5  0  1  0  0 
S                    0                    0  0  0  0  5 
 
Coop  Market Spot  Contracts   In-House 



































I                    0  1  1  0  3  0  0  2  0 
AF                    0  2  0  0  0  0  0  2  3 
RF                    0  0  0  0  5  0  0  0  0 
S                    0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  5 
I: Incubators          AF: Animal Feeding            RF: Raising Farmers          S: Slaughtering   19 
 
Throughout these two tables representing the way private groups and cooperatives undertake 
these four activities, we can first notice that industrialization of agriculture typically leads to 
the increase of contractual forms.  The industrialization of the sector resulted in a more 
coordinated process
10. In fact, compared to other industrial sectors, poultry production chain 
deals with highly perishable commodities, as “chicks” and “chicken” cannot be stored (an 
exception remains for feed production that can be stored). So, as long as animals have not 
been slaughtered, the coordination of their production holds an essential role.  
Indeed, contractual agreements remain the most used organizational form as opposed to spot 
market, as we can see that French operators no longer rely on “one shot” contract (only 
present for 3% of the raising activity for one private group). At the other extreme, vertical 
integration is quite present, it is important for private groups essentially in the slaughtering 
activity (as it is their starting activity), and for cooperatives in the animal feeding production 
activity, as we can notice that the five cooperatives integrate this activity for at least more 
than fifty percent of their needs. Relying on these first synthetic results, one essential question 
remains: Can TCA rely on this only triptych classification to justify its utility?  
 
In fact, considering the variety of characteristics of these contractual relationships from an 
activity to another, we can adopt two behaviours. We can either place the contractual forms 
under the umbrella of “hybrid” forms, simply locating them between the two antagonist poles 
notwithstanding their differences; or, we can  consider  that these contractual agreements 
present different advantages and limits and that their classification is therefore at least as 
important as the one operated between market and in-house governance modes. Indeed, 
placing all the forms of exchange that are based on inter firm agreement under the designation 
of “contracts” does not allow us to study the variety of these relationships that contrast among 
activities.  For example, can we place sub contracting, quasi integration (in the sense of 
Monteverde and Teece) or quasi integration (in the sense of Blois) between a supplier and a 
buyer at the same standing point?  Do these forms result in the same level of transaction 
costs?  
To our view a classification of these contracts must introduce many other dimensions present 
in the conceptual and empirical literature, most essentially,  the formality of the contract 
                                                 
10 The French research group “ATOM”, has published many papers dealing with the effects of industrialization 
on the contractual forms in a ll agri-food industry and especially in poultry industry (Ménard, Sauvée, 
Raynaud…).   20 
(explicit or oral), its duration and renewal mode, its enforcement and supervision modes and 
so forth.  
 
Contractual agreements: differences among  activities and  “re  thinking”  for a 
classification 
Before thinking for a classification of these inter-firm agreements, it is necessary to briefly 
present  the main contractual typologies present in the agricultural sector. These contracts 
already offer insights about the nature of the relationship that links the customer to its 
suppliers. It also offers insights about the location of these hybrids, if they are either closer to 
market form or to hierarchy. Mighell and Jones (1963) already discuss several administered 
arrangements for vertical coordination
11 in the food sector. They offer three general contract 
types that follow the progression of increasing dominance by one party. These contracts are 
classified as follows: market specification, production management and resource providing. 
However they rely on neo classical producer theory as the unique dimension remains the 
dominance of one party over the other.  
Figure 3: Mighell and Jones’s contractual typology 
 
Spot               Market                       Production                 Resource                          Vertical  
Market          Specification              Management             Providing                          Integration 
 
                                                             Contractual agreements 
 
This classification has been enriched by Rousset
12 (2005), who relies on a more detailed 
typology (See figure 4). He  adds a contract that is very present in poultry industry, the 
“contrat à façon”.  This contract can take place in the relation between an integrator and its 
growers. More precisely, the integrator orders chicken to the farmers (growers) whom become 
nearly “integrated to the group”, as the former provides them with chicks, animal feeding and 
technical support that are free of charge. And, the breeder is paid an amount called a “façon”, 
once the animal delivered.  
                                                 
11 The concept of vertical coordination is very often used in agricultural studies. Henderson and Franck (1992) 
building on Marion (1976:180) explain that “vertical coordination is a more comprehensive concept capturing 
not only vertical integration, but the entire process by which the various functions of a vertical value adding 
system are brought into harmony […] vertical coordination encompasses all means of harmonizing vertically 
interdependent production and distribution activities ranging from spot markets from various type of contracts 
to complete integration”.  
 
12 Rousset borrows this typology to Mazé (2000), to which he brings more specifications.    21 
Figure 4: Rousset’s main typology of contracts in agriculture 
   
Market                                                                                                                     Hierarchy 
 
Spot          Selling              Production             Integration          “Contrat               Vertical  
Market     arrangement      contract                  contract               à façon »              Integration 
                  Requirements    Requirements         Furniture             Labour                Labour 
                  based                based                      of  all                   force                    Contract 
                  on final             on  production        production                                           
                  product            factors                     factors 
 
The “ contrat à façon” is therefore very  close  to vertical integration, the only difference 
remains the ownership of the chicken houses that are still properties of farmers. This contract 
is also close from “integration contracts”. The main difference is that in the latter, animals are 
properties of the farmers as they pay for the inputs (chicks, feeding…) and they sell back the 
output (the chicken) throughout a pre fixed price. Indeed, animals are property of farmers 
during the whole growing process, contrarily to the former in which farmers only provide 
their labour force. In the two cases however, the integrator bears the risk alone as he is forced 
to take back or buy the animals programmed with the farmers. This form is close to 
Monteverde and Teece’s quasi integration concept as the inputs used, are property of the 
“integrator”. A deeper analysis is then undertaken for each contractual agreement. These 
agreements are detailed in the following table.  
 
Table 5: Extent of contractual agreements within cooperatives and private groups 
  I  AF  B  S 
Private groups 
DOUX  40 %  2 %  100 %  × 
LDC  100 %  50 %  97 %  × 
ARRIVE  100 %  20 %  100 %  × 
E. Soulard  25 %  ×  70 %  × 
V. Périgord  100 %  100 %  100 %  × 
Cooperatives 
UNICOPA  30 %  5 %  100 %  × 
COOPAGRI  30 %  5 %  100 %  × 
TERRENA  15 %  ×  100 %  5% 
CECAB  100 %  ×  100 %  × 
AGRIAL  100 %  ×  100 %  20% 
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The contractual agreements studied are essentially based on Brousseau’s insights to which we 
have added a question concerning the renewal of the exchange relationship (Blanchot 1998) 
and a question concerning the formality of the contract (Macaulay 1963).  These interviews 
are analyzed in a qualitative way, and we next present a synthesis of the main features of each 
contractual relationship.  
 
We will focus on the way slaughterers (belonging either to cooperatives or to private groups) 
organize contractual relationships with incubator, animal feeding producers and growers.  In 
fact, cooperatives or private groups do not contract with an independent slaughter for the 
unique “slaughtering” of chicken. In fact, companies, if they do not own their slaughtering 
houses, sell the production to private slaughterers that undertake the whole downward process 
themselves (slaughtering, processing and selling). This situation is only noticed in 
cooperatives as theses were in the beginning only involved in the upward production. When a 
cooperative sells a part of its production to a private slaughterer, it is a selling arrangement. 
The cooperative AGRIAL for example used to sell its whole production to private 
slaughterers but it has progressively integrated its slaughterers and it now only sells 20% of its 
chicken to a private slaughterer “Ramon”. Consequently, “slaughtering activity” is much 




Incubation activity  
Contractual agreements are the dominant form in this activity. In fact, there are no companies 
that undertake the whole activity in-house. More precisely, 3 private groups and 2 
cooperatives undertake the whole activity through contracts, and only  one cooperative 
contracts less than 20% of its activity. Relying on Rousset (2005), these contracts are “selling 
arrangement” as requirements are only based upon the final product: the “baby chick”.  
 
The relationship between incubators and “integrators” are “seller/buyer” relationships based 
on contractual agreements.  Contracts do exist as professionals work following technical 
requirements, but they are incomplete as changes are quite frequent (demand fluctuates and 
the nature of t he product ordered often leads to  readjustments).  Incubators master the 
incubation process.  They are  responsible for improvement products, for research and 
development, for the creation of more productive chicks. Incubators provide many groups and 
the relationship is none “exclusive”.    23 
Strategic and organizational coordination are rather  located between centralization and 
decentralization, as in theory, the integrator is the final customer and his requirements are 
determinant. However, negotiation is very important, and even though the integrators impose 
technical requirements, in almost cases,  mutual dependency leads to a more  equal 
relationship. Operational coordination is rather based on routines, as schedules, quantities, 
type of product ordered, are generally assimilated through time.  However,  decentralized 
adjustment can take place as bargaining  concerning  schedules,  prices and quantities  for 
example, can be negotiated (as it was the case during the bird flu crises for example). As 
explains an informant: “we both need each other, and we know that we have to work hand in 
hand […] we need to join our efforts, and in period of crises, losses must be shared. We know 
that in periods of take off we will need the supplier’s production capacity”. 
 
For all companies surveyed, the enforcement mode is based on credible commitment and trust 
as there is no hostage exchanged. If, the quality of the chicks delivered is really under the 
standard quality,  disputes can be resolved through courts, but this is very rare. Supervision is 
generally undertaken by an external specialized supervisor which audits the supplier twice a 
year. Indeed, integrators do not always master sufficiently the incubation process.  
 
In fact, the companies often explain that the supplier is much more considered like a partner. 
This idea has already been underlined by Macaulay (1963) that shows how businessmen often 
prefer to rely on “a handshake”, even where the transaction involve exposure to a serious risk. 
And, as he adds that even when contracts are used, disputes are rarely litigated. He observes 
that contract elaboration can indicate a lack of trust and blunts the demand of friendship. As 
explains an interviewee: «Reputation is very important as people never forget, we are 
operating in the agricultural sector  which is a small community where  loyalty holds an 
important place”. 
  
Remuneration is fixed ex ante, and is not dependent on the performance of the chicks 
delivered. Finally, all these contractual agreements are based on a lasting relationship, in 
which contracts are generally implicitly renewed through time.  
 
Contracts rely on technical requirements, but oral communication is much more important, as 
explains one of the informants “Phone calls and emails are used to modify quantities, animal 
types […], things can be bargained in an informal way, it costs much less than putting in   24 
place a complete contract”. However, we have noticed one cooperative that relies on an 
annual written contract and for which they say introducing competition through an arm’s 
length relationship, making contracts more “market like”. 
 
This activity is therefore based on a selling arrangement  in which dimensions such are long 
term relationships, trust, self enforcement, that are presented earlier reinforce our idea that 
these relationships are based on “partnerships”. Moreover, contracts even when they exist, 
only determinate the guidelines, and adjustments are in most cases informal and renewed 
automatically over time. This form based on a “sell and buy” relationship, is firstly thought as 
a “closer to the market” mode of governance. However, a further study of these dimensions 
relates a contractual agreement that is more considered as a partnership in which parties rely 
on one another. Consequently, deeper analysis of inter firm agreements reveals more “firm 
like” characteristics. Personal relationships, duration of the agreements, reputation effects 
seem to offer efficient adaptation instruments that limit the “hit and run” behaviours that 
constitute the most important dimension in the TCA.  Contractual agreements  between 
integrators and their incubators can be described as follows: (A2/A3, B2/B3, C1/3, D1, 
E4, F1, G3), and contracts, even though existent are rather adjusted in an informal way 
and they are more often renewed through time.        
 
 
Animal feeding activity 
This activity is less contractualized than the previous one. In fact, cooperatives rarely 
undertake this activity through contracts. We can notice that two cooperatives put in place 
contracts but it only concerns 5% of their needs. Private groups put in place more contracts 
than cooperatives as only one group internalizes the whole activity. The others contract 2, 20, 
50, and 100% of their needs. In fact, this activity is less critical than the other, as the product 
can be stored and needs to be less “programmed” than other activities such as incubating, 
raising and slaughtering which are directly linked to the life cycle of the animals. Therefore, 
animal feeding is a product that is easy to purchase and that can be quite rapidly produced.    
 
Groups put in place contractual  “selling arrangements” with external suppliers. Strategic, 
organizational and operational coordination are generally  based on routines, however, 
contingencies do occur and especially concern price fluctuation (the prices often fluctuates   25 
based on the fluctuation of the cereal prices). And, when changes occur, bargaining does exist 
especially concerning operational coordination.  
 
No credible commitments are settled down and s upervision  is self enforced  by the 
“integrators” themselves. A problem with the feed product will simply put an end to the 
contractual agreement. The integrator has to make sure of the quality of the product bought, 
and reputation as well as experience will be determinant in the relationship. 
 
Remuneration is established ex ante on a flat basis. Duration of the contract is rather short as 
it is included from one to two years. Contracts exist, however tacit changes can occur. These 
contracts are often renewed through time but integrators can buy from other suppliers if these 
offer better conditions. Contracts are more often moral as “simple phone calls” are undertaken 
to order, increase or decrease  ordered  quantities of animal food. Trust is once more 
determinant and reputation effect limit “hit and run” behaviour.  
The stability of the relationships offers more security about the quality of the product that is 
an important element in the required traceability, but groups can arbitrate between two or 
more suppliers and introduce competition among them.    
Consequently in general contracts with feeders can be described as follows: (A1/3, B1/3, 
C1/3, D1, E1, F1, G3), contracts, even though existent are rather informal but they are 
not  automatically  tacitly  renewed. G roups c hange  their  animal  feeding producer 
supplier more often than their incubators.        
 
Breeding activity 
Contractual agreements between “ integrators” and  raising farmers must be distinguished 
considering private groups and cooperatives.  
 
Private groups 
As explained previously, the reading of contractual agreements between integrators and their 
farmers, depends on whether specifications concern final product, production factors, input 
furniture for which animals are property of farmers, or input furniture for which animals are 
property of the integrator (Rousset 2005, Mazé 2002). In fact, contracts between two parties 
are based on a set of tough technical and sanitary requirements that are established in the 
“cahier des charges”. We notice two predominant types of contracts: integration contracts and 
contracts “à façon”. Groups and cooperative never own chicken houses (only very rare cases   26 
exist) as in France institutional and environmental pressures limit full vertical integration of 
groups.  
In total, one group relies on a production contract, and another relies on a “contrat à façon”, 
while the three others put in place “integration contracts”. The group Doux for example 
remains one of the more “integrated” private groups as he produces 90% of his production 
relying on a “ contrat à façon”. The remaining 10% are produced through “integration 
contracts”. 
 
These contracts rely on centralized strategic and organizational  coordination modes, while 
operational modes are  rather  based on routines. The  integrator largely dominates the 
relationship.  
 
Contracts are usually written and relationships last over time (more than three years) and are 
more often tacitly renewed.  While a part of the remuneration is fixed ex ante, another part of 
it  depends on  the performance  of the breeder. Indeed a part of the remuneration of the 
breeders is based on settlement cost performance related to the feed conversion index 
(Knoeber 1989, 1994, 1995). These settlement costs fall as feed conversion improves. 
Remuneration  therefore  includes a  flat rate and  breeders never share losses. However 
incentives do exist as part of remuneration is customized. In fact, breeders never shares losses, 
and contracts do not include risk sharing as the production is  always taken back by the 
integrator at the pre fixed price without reference to market prices of feed and baby chicks. 
The breeder invests in chicken houses and this makes him dependent on the integrator that 
consequently controls pressure mechanisms. W e can therefore consider that there is a 
unilateral credible commitment.  Supervision is undertaken by the groups themselves 
throughout their own specialized technicians that frequently control growers.  
 
These contracts overpass simple contractual agreements, and they are clearly characterized by 
the dominance of the “integrator” that quasi integrates the growers. This relationship is close 
from Monteverde and Teece’s “ quasi integration”, particularly concerning the “ contrat à 
façon” that is nearly equivalent to full integration.  
Contracts with growers, independently of the nature (whether they are production, integration 
or “ à façon” contracts) have very  similar  features. The only  difference remaining the 
integrator’s dominance, making these contractual agreement increasingly “firm like”.     27 
Consequently, contracts can be describe as follows (A2, B2, C1, D2, E3, F3/F4, G3, formal, 
often tacit renewal). 
 
Cooperatives  
Describing the relationship between a cooperative and its growers needs a further lightening. 
In fact, as explained earlier, a cooperative is by d efinition owned by its members. 
Cooperatives also work with independent growers. Agrial and Coopagri for example only 
work with  members, while Terrena produces  70 % with members and the rest with 
independent farmers.  Unicopa produces 65% with  members and 35% with non members. 
Finally, Cecab only works with members for 40% of its production. Cooperatives never put in 
place “à façon” contracts, and they rely upon  “integration contract”. Consequently, growers 
are always property of members who buy chicks and seed, benefit from technical supports and 
sell back animals to either slaughterers owned by the cooperative or to external slaughters. 
Contractual agreements with non members are close to those undertaken by private groups.  
 
Farmers play a double function. In fact, they can influence the global strategy of the 
cooperative being by definition partial owners of this entity. The strategic and organizational 
coordination are established by the cooperative’s general assembly that orients strategic and 
organizational objectives. Therefore, as global orientation can be influenced by the breeders, 
strategic and organizational coordination modes are  located between a centralized and a 
decentralized authority. Operational coordination relies on a rather complete contract that is 
“routinized”. Credible commitments are also unilateral. Hence,  members invest in  chicken 
houses as well and they pay  an “entry fee”.  Supervision is undertaken throughout the 
cooperative’s own technicians. 
Remuneration is  based on e x ante fixed prices and b reeders never share losses and 
remuneration is similar to the one undertaken by private groups, as it is based on a flat rate 
and a part is based on an intensity of use basis. Contracts are written and it is at least a five 
years period contract.  
 
Consequently, contracts with members can be describe as follows (A2/3, B3, C1, D3, E3, 
F3/F4, G3, formal, often tacit renewal). Contracts with non members are similar to the 
previous integration contract described for private groups.  
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Consequences on research 
This classification based on the main  features of the contractual agreements underlines two 
important  points. First,  this classification offers quite  complete dimensions  for the 
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Feed Production Contracts  29 
complete the transactional  framework.  Definitely, c omparing  features of the  contractual 
agreement in place to the transaction attributes should improve TCA testing.  
 
For example, when transactions are involved with high specificity, contractual agreements 
including a rather centralized coordination mode, is more efficient in transaction cots reducing 
than a decentralized coordination mode. The deposit of bilateral or unilateral hostage is also 
more efficient than the inexistence of credible commitments. Supervision undertaken by a 
specialized party (one of the co-contractor or a third party) results in less transaction costs 
than the recourse to a non specialized arbitrator. Remuneration based on the intensity of use 
(if effort is easy to measure) and risk sharing, can limit the transaction costs relatively to a 
remuneration based on a collective sharing in which  free riding behaviours can more easily 
take place.  
 
Indeed, in this case for example, breeding contractual agreements are more efficient than feed 
producing contracts to economize on transaction costs. Incubators agreements even though 
less centralized do not result in transaction costs that are dramatically higher, as stability of 
the relationship facilitates rapid adaptation between partners. Integration contracts offer more 
“integrated” relationships than membership breeding relationships within cooperatives, as in 
the latter breeders can more easily negotiate.  The opening of Hybrid’s black box confirms the 
need for deeper digging. This brief and synthetic comparison confirms that the study of the 
“make or buy” decision based on a triptych classification does not permit  to put in light 
important differences among contractual agreements, that are at least as important as the 
differences between the two polar forms.     
 
Second, this research highlights the importance of more “social” and “human” dimensions 
such as personal relationships, trust and reputation effects, that where underlined in almost all 
interviews conducted. These dimensions  have already been  stated in previous studies 
(Macaulay 1963, Chen 2000) and they constitute one of the most virulent critics opposed to 
TCA (Goshal and Moran 1996).  For us, these dimensions should rather complete  the 
transactional approach. More precisely,  Hybrid forms can sometimes  “hold”  an exchange 
relationship that includes  high level of asset specificity a nd that is recurrent,  without 
generating dramatic transaction costs. Indeed, importance of loyalty and of reputation effects 
can have a great decreasing effect on transaction costs. Moreover, recurrence of transactions 
often stabilizes relationships through time, as personal relationships take place. Consequently,   30 
these social dimensions can “hold” contractual agreements without necessarily shifting to full 
integration, and,  “hit and run” behaviours that are feared by parties can therefore be 
annihilated. T he poultry industry  seems to be a perfect illustration of  this situation. 
Macaulay’s earlier study (1963) on contracts already showed the importance of trust and 
informal contracts in business life. If this appears to be true, there are situations in which 
parties can rely on  long term  contractual agreements  without a dramatic increase in 





This article  aimed at discussing the place of hybrid form within the transactional 
conversation. It first tried to show the multiple difficulties that these forms are confronted to, 
such as, the multiplicity of definitions, the ambiguity resulting from the conceptual model as 
well as the heterogeneity of empirical studies.  
 
We then presented studies that offer interesting starting points to improve the classification of 
these forms. These studies where used to describe contractual agreements among the poultry 
production chain. This analysis first confirmed the variety of contractual agreement existing 
in the poultry industry.  Second, it showed how hybrid forms include a variety of 
characteristics that do not seem to economize on transaction costs equally. This confirms the 
need  to open Hybrid’s “black box”, and to study these forms compared to one another. 
Moreover, we think that putting aside dimensions such as trust and reputation effects, does 
not lead to a realistic framework. Indeed, the introduction of these dimensions can largely 
explain the reliance on a long term agreement to undertake a transaction that involves highly 
specific assets. 
 
Consequently, a  precise analysis of effects of independent variables (i.e. specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency) on depend variables when they are “hybrid”, can not be rigorous 
without a deeper analysis of the continuum of forms located between markets and firms. 
Indeed, simply comparing hybrids to the two polar forms does not put in light the differences 
among inter firm agreements. G oing further in this direction can lead to testing TCA in a 
more realistic way.  
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